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Between 15%-60% of patients are considered “difficult” by their treating physicians. Patient psychiatric
pathology is the conventional explanation for why patients are deemed “difficult.” But the prevalence of the
problem suggests the possibility of a less pathological cause. I argue that the phenomenon can be better
explained as responses to problematic interactions related to healthcare delivery. If there are grounds to
reconceive the “difficult” patient as reacting to the perception of ill treatment, then there is an ethical
obligation to address this perception of harm. Resolution of such conflicts currently lies with the provider and
patient. But the ethical stakes place these conflicts into the province of the ethics consult service. As the
resource for addressing ethical dilemmas, there is a moral mandate to offer assistance in the resolution of these
ethically charged conflicts that is no less pressing than the more familiar terrain of clinical ethics consultation.
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Between 15%-60% of patients are considered “difficult” by their treating physicians.  
Patient psychiatric pathology is the conventional explanation for why patients are deemed 
“difficult.” But the prevalence of the problem suggests the possibility of a less pathological 
cause.  I argue that the phenomenon can be better explained as responses to problematic 
interactions related to healthcare delivery.  If there are grounds to reconceive the “difficult” 
patient as reacting to the perception of ill treatment, then there is an ethical obligation to address 
this perception of harm.  Resolution of such conflicts currently lies with the provider and patient.  
But the ethical stakes place these conflicts into the province of the ethics consult service. As the 
resource for addressing ethical dilemmas, there is a moral mandate to offer assistance in the 
resolution of these ethically charged conflicts that is no less pressing than the more familiar 
terrain of clinical ethics consultation.   
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The “Difficult” Patient Reconceived: 




 Between 15%-60% of patients are considered “difficult” by their treating physicians 
(Hahn 1994; Jackson and Kroenke 1999; Hahn 2001).  Even at the lower end of those estimates, 
the implication is that a significant portion of doctor-patient relationships are fraught with 
conflict, negative feelings, and unsatisfying interactions.  There is no shortage of literature 
highlighting the harmful consequence to both physician and patient of a dysfunctional treating 
relationship (Lin 1999; Steinmetz 2001; Wasan 2005; Miksanek 2008), so the moral imperative 
to resolve such conflicts is clear.  But the remedy, of course, depends on the cause. The 
conventional explanation for these conflicts lays the blame squarely at the feet of the patient, 
typically via mental disorders or maladaptive personality traits, and the specter of flawed moral 
character lurks as well.  But the prevalence of the problem either serves as a psychological and 
moral indictment for up to 60% of our citizenry, or its pervasiveness suggests the possibility of a 
less pathological cause.  In fact, I argue that the behaviors that saddle a patient with the label 
“difficult” can better be explained as responses to problematic interactions or negative 
experiences related to the delivery of medical care.  If there are grounds to reconceive the 
“difficult” patient as someone reacting to the perception of ill treatment in the clinic – someone 
who feels morally wronged – then there is an ethical obligation to address this perception of 
harm.   
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Resolution of such conflicts currently lies solely in the dyad of provider and patient.  But 
the ethical stakes, I argue, place this species of conflict into the province of the ethics consult 
service (ECS).  As the resource for addressing ethical dilemmas that occur at the bedside or 
clinic, there is a moral mandate to offer assistance in the resolution of this pervasive type of 
ethically charged conflict that is no less pressing or consequential than the more familiar terrain 
of clinical ethics consultation.   
 
The Conventional View of the “Difficult” Patient 
Research on the “difficult” patient generally defines the problem exclusively from the 
physician’s perspective (Kahn 2009; Haas 205; Gerrard and Riddell 1988; Lin 1999; Steinmetz 
2001; Miksanek 2008). “Difficult” patients are typically described as “those who raise negative 
feelings within the clinician,” presumably due to behaviors deemed “inappropriate” in a 
treatment setting (Wasan 2005).  The clinician’s experience of frustration, anxiety, guilt, or 
dislike in interactions with the patient frames the research that explores the causal explanation of 
the dysfunctional dynamic.  The conclusion reached by most studies is that a set of patient-
centered problems or flaws accounts for the inappropriate behavior. The most commonly 
attributed cause of the “difficult” patient is the presence of a psychiatric disorder. Concludes one 
study, “The difficult or frustrating patient…often has unrecognized psychiatric problems” (Haas 
et al 2005).  Others concur (Lin et al 1991; Hahn 1996). The candidates for such psychiatric 
diagnoses range from depression and anxiety to “comorbid psychopathology, hostility, 
suicidality, aberrant drug behavior, and chronic noncompliance” (Wasan 2005).   
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What seems to go unnoticed in these studies is that some of what is couched as mental 
illness falls well inside the range of “normal” for individuals faced with significant life-stressors 
such as either illness or the perception of ill treatment.  Hostility, anger, depression, anxiety and 
even noncompliance are common reactions to difficult circumstances, even among the 
psychologically healthy and typically well-adjusted.  Even if we grant that some patients who 
exhibit behaviors that get them labeled “difficult” have a diagnosable psychiatric disorder, there 
will be others who exhibit these same behaviors who do not: though there may be a correlation in 
some patients of psychiatric diagnosis and “difficult” behaviors, this does not demonstrate 
causation.  In fact, even among those patients who have both a psychiatric diagnosis and are 
perceived as “difficult,” it is not clear that the negative behaviors are caused by the patient’s 
psychiatric condition.   
 A closer look at one of the studies that confidently claims that “significant 
psychopathologic disorders” (Hahn 2001) is the root cause of the “difficult” patient reveals how 
spurious that conclusion really is.  Hahn’s own study finds two other significant factors that 
correlate strongly with physician-perceptions of “‘hateful,’ ‘heartsink,’ ‘problem,’ or ‘difficult’ 
patients” (Hahn 2001).  First, 90% of the patients described as “difficult” were found to have an 
”abrasive personality style,” which is practically a tautological conclusion: the meek and mild 
wouldn’t be forceful enough to earn the title “difficult,” so it is definitionally true that 
temperament plays a large role in landing a patient in this category.  Second, the most significant 
predictor of being labeled “difficult” – and one that could not be explained away by association 
with psychopathology – was having multiple symptoms, five in particular: “stomach pain, 
fainting, sleep problems, loose stools/diarrhea, and palpitations” (Hahn 2001).  These patients 
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were reported by physicians as being both “time consuming” and “manipulative,” and they 
garnered high levels of physician-frustration. Though Hahn takes great pains to convince the 
reader that patients with psychopathologies have a predilection for psychosomatic complaints 
and that somatoform disorders might thus account for the correlation between “difficult” and 
“multiple symptoms,” he admits that physicians are “frustrated by the symptoms’ ‘vagueness’ 
and their own inability to make a diagnosis” (Hahn 2001).  In other words, a physician may label 
a patient “difficult” because of her own inability to effectively diagnose or treat the problem, or 
because of a patient’s reaction to this failure.    
 All told, then, the foregoing explanations for the “difficult” patient are partial at best and 
specious at worst.    
 
The “Difficult” Patient Reconceived 
 The studies designed to detect the causes of the problematic patient expend almost no 
attention defining the set of patient-behaviors that provoke the label “difficult.”  Although one 
author defends this lack of precision by claiming that it is “intuitively understood” (Hahn 2001), 
it turns out that there is a wide range of behaviors falling under this rubric in the literature, many 
of which do not even seem inappropriate, let alone pathological.  In the laundry list of one study, 
the “difficult” patient includes: “patients who make repeated visits without apparent medical 
benefit, patients who do not seem to want to get well, patients who engage in power struggles, 
and patients who focus on issues seemingly unrelated to medical care” (Haas 2005).  In contrast 
to this relatively benign list, a different study identifies the set as: “[i]nvalidating, demanding, 
disruptive, attention-seeking, annoying, and manipulative behavior” (Knesper 2007).  To make 
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the case that we need to reconceive the “difficult” patient, I want to focus on the worst of what 
might invite this label, namely, behaviors that include: raising one’s voice or shouting, using foul 
language, making accusatory remarks or insulting comments, making racial or ethnic slurs, or 
using sexist, homophobic, racist, or anti-Semitic epithets.  If these incontrovertibly inappropriate 
behaviors lend themselves to a more compelling explanation than patient-pathology, then the 
arguably more benign set surely will. To make the argument, then, that we have misdiagnosed 
the underlying cause of the “difficult” patient, let’s look at the following case of Fred: 
Case 
Fred is a 17-year-old man with an incomplete C-4 injury to his spinal cord as the result of 
a gunshot wound. He is currently unable to move his arms or legs, though he does have 
sensation in his lower extremities. Before his injury, Fred attended school intermittently 
and was on probation for heroin possession. Fred was admitted to an in-patient 
rehabilitation unit after two weeks in acute care. His mother is unable to visit during the 
week because of her work schedule and the patient’s only other living relative is an 
elderly grandmother who is homebound. Since he has come to the rehab hospital, Fred 
has been verbally abusive to staff, frequently using racial slurs. His cursing, often loud, 
distresses the other patients, as well as the physicians and other staff. Fred often 
complains of pain and screams loudly when moved, though his physicians insist he is on 
the highest dose of narcotics that they feel comfortable prescribing. Because of Fred’s 
language and derogatory comments, both physicians and nurses are starting to refuse to 
work with him.  
 
Fred is difficult. 
 What makes Fred an ideal patient to discuss in this context is that he obviously has an 
“abrasive personality style,” indisputably has multiple symptoms, some of which are being 
presumed to be exaggerated or imagined, and likely has at least one psychiatric diagnosis.  And 
yet…we could put ourselves in Fred’s shoes and envision myriad interactions that he might 
experience on a daily basis at this rehab hospital that would seriously test our equanimity and 
self-possession, though we may have none of the hypothesized causes for being difficult.  
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Consider the treatment, situations and dynamics that would provoke anyone’s ire as a patient.  
How often has Fred felt patronized, dismissed, demeaned, or humiliated?  How many needless 
indignities has he been subjected to? Does he feel powerless and emasculated, and, if so, from 
the injury or the treatment they are giving for it? Does he feel heard, validated, and respected? 
Does he believe that they are treating him as well as they treat all other patients, or does he 
sincerely believe that their view of him is prejudiced by his past truancy and heroin use? Does he 
feel victim to being branded “drug-seeking,” “gang member,” “high school drop-out,” or 
“junkie”? Does he believe that the clinical team really cares about him?  Do they?  
 The key to Fred’s escalating bad behavior lies in the answers to the question: does Fred 
feels mistreated or wronged?  Persons who feel indignation, resentment, or offense are 
susceptible to manifesting their moral grievance in counterproductive ways.  Only the most self-
controlled consistently work through moral offense by calm, rational, productive means.  Fred’s 
behavior should be first and foremost understood as a reaction to a therapeutic situation that is 
malfunctioning for him, failing to meet his needs, and perhaps undermining his sense of self and 
self-esteem. But you might object: which came first, his bad behavior or his perception that he is 
being treated badly?  Let’s assume that he treated the staff badly from the moment of his in-take, 
motivated not by a loss of faith in the medical establishment from his stay at the acute-care 
hospital, but sourced solely in the horrific situation he finds himself in: he was merely angry at 
fate, God, the person who shot him, his family – who knows – but there was no culpability on the 
part of any clinical provider.  Let’s grant all of that.  What reactions did he get at the rehab 
hospital to his understandable anger and frustration?  What stereotypes or bias lie underneath the 
attitudes or perceptions of his current caregivers? What sources of support did they offer him? 
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How did they reassure him that his mental, spiritual, emotional, and physical well-being would 
be safeguarded with them? 
 Lending credence to this reconceived view of the “difficult” patient is an older nursing 
study that looked at the perspectives of patients deemed “difficult” by their clinical team.  The 
study participants claimed that if they were given more respect and decision-making power, their 
potent feelings of anger would be significantly reduced (Breeze and Repper 1998).  Another 
study found that causal explanations for the behavior of the “difficult” patient differed markedly 
between physician and patient (Lin 1991).  Tellingly, physicians who scored lower on scales 
measuring empathy were more likely to perceive their patients as “difficult” than those who 
scored higher (Jackson and Kroenke 1999).  The moral of this study, then, is that the behaviors 
being exhibited by patients are less objectively “difficult” and more vulnerable to the “eye of the 
beholder” problem that may over-state or exacerbate those negative behaviors. 
 The conventional view that locates the source of patient-provider conflict in the patient’s 
mental or physical pathologies is not only weak as an explanatory model, but ethically 
irresponsible for the way it undermines our resolve to explore more nuanced causal dynamics 
and redress them.  The reconceived view of the “difficult” patient calls for that exact re-
examination, viewing the fractured patient-provider relationship not only as amendable to repair, 
but as demanding that level of moral attention.  
 
The Ethical Obligations to the “Difficult” Patient 
Re-framing the “difficult” patient as someone who perceives himself as wronged in the 
medical encounter – perceives being treated unfairly, disrespectfully, dismissively, 
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condescendingly, or offensively – generates an ethical duty to address, validate, repair, or assist 
in making amends.  And those obligations to assist are binding whether the ethical harm is 
perceived or real.  In other words, whether there is any true culpability on either side misses the 
point: if my behavior towards you is reactive, the solution for altering it is to change my 
perceptions.  Take as an example: if a patient’s perceptions shift from feeling dismissed to 
feeling validated, the original intentions, dynamics, or actions on the part of the provider are not 
relevant.  The provider may have had the very best of intentions, and the perception of the 
provider’s being dismissive could have been pure misunderstanding.  But what matters in 
resolving “difficult” behavior is that a new understanding of mutual respect has been forged, and 
that new understanding will translate into transformed conduct on the part of the patient. 
Lest this analysis itself seems condescending to the “difficult” patient, consider the case 
of Susan. 
Case 
Susan is the mother of an 8-year-old daughter, Emily, who has come to a children’s 
hospital for a possible fracture of a growth plate in her ankle. Emily’s injury is a week 
old, but it took that long to get an appointment with the pediatric orthopedic surgeon and 
could not be treated by her general pediatrician. Emily has been in significant pain all 
week. Susan and Emily arrive on time for their 1:00 appointment, where they are shown 
into a small, sparse exam room with no toys or books. After an hour of waiting, Susan 
goes to speak with an unfriendly receptionist who tells her she has no idea how much 
longer it will be.  Another hour goes by, and Emily is in pain, bored, cranky, and hungry.  
When the orthopedic surgeon finally arrives at 3:30, he is brusque, offers no apology for 
the extensive wait, and starts to complain that his busy day has allowed him time only to 
eat two Powerbars. Susan begins to yell loudly at the clinician.  
 
The case of Susan is instructive because there is clear culpability on the care-delivery side.  At 
the very least, there is a systems-level problem in both appointment scheduling and adequate 
infrastructure for pediatric patients; but also the physician seems to bear some responsibility for 
Autumn Fiester, PhD 
Department of Medical Ethics and Health Policy 
Perelman School of Medician at the University of Pennsylvania 
 





Susan’s outburst by his failure to acknowledge the institutional issues, his brusque bedside 
manner, and the mention of his own needs before addressing Emily’s.  Susan has compelling 
grounds for taking offense: this is no mere misunderstanding.  But the approach to remedying 
Susan’s negative reaction – i.e., the means to resolve or alter her “difficult” behavior – does not 
differ or depend on the moral fact-pattern of the case.  She is offended and feels wronged on 
behalf of her daughter, and when she feels her concerns have been heard, validated and 
addressed, she will surely stop yelling. 
 The moral salve called for in such cases is the basic set of conflict-resolution techniques, 
and this is not lost on the authors of research about the “difficult” patient. One author after 
another advises an approach to resolving the problems in the doctor-patient relationship through 
a process either implicitly or explicitly identified as mediation and negotiation.  For example, in 
the piece, “My Favorite Tips for Engaging the Difficult Patient on Consultation-Liaison 
Psychiatry Services,” the author is quite upfront about borrowing his solutions from the Harvard 
Negotiation Project (Knesper 2007).  Knesper suggests, first, a strategy of “mediation and 
developing the third story,” a key concept from a well-known book by Harvard Negotiation 
Project instructors of developing a version of the events that both disputing parties can agree on 
(Stone, Patton, and Heen 1999); and, second, a process of “negotiating, concession making, and 
control sharing” (Knesper 2007), a classic next-step in the mediation method.  In a recent NEJM 
piece on dealing with the “difficult” patient, the author advocates gleaning insights from conflict-
resolution methodology, for example, arguing, “Successful negotiation begins with some basic 
understanding of the other side’s position” (Kahn 2009).  Others writing on the “difficult” patient 
allude to mediation methods, though not by name (Bellet 1994; Haas 2005), and one author 
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generates a didactic mnemonic that could have been plucked straight from classic negotiation 
texts: 
“Five A’s for Dealing with Hostile Patients” 
1. Acknowledge the problem. 
2. Allow the patient to vent uninterrupted in a private place.  
3. Agree on what the problem is.  
4. Affirm what can be done.  
5. Assure follow-through (Wasan 2005).  
 
 The recommendations and guidance offered by these authors are intended for the 
physicians directly involved in conflicts with their patients.  They are meant to help the clinician 
cope more effectively with patients they view as “‘hateful,’ ‘heartsink,’ ‘problem,’ or ‘difficult.’”  
But while a mediation skill set is very handy to have, and may indeed forestall problems or even 
rectify a doctor-patient relationship gone bad, it is asking a lot of a stakeholder in a conflict to 
also be that conflict’s mediator.  In fact, although the authors cited above accurately represent the 
relevant mediation techniques, they fail to grasp one of the fundamental principles of mediation: 
it is a process conducted by a neutral third party.  Physicians embroiled in a doctor-patient 
conflict are dealing with negative feelings of anger, frustration, anxiety, or guilt – after all, the 
very definition of the “difficult” patient is someone who engenders those very feelings.  
Physicians in these conflicts are partisans, and as such, it is not easy for them to bracket those 
negative feelings in order to conduct a conversation that is impartial or lacks an intrinsic bias.  If 
they can, they deserve a great deal of credit.  But having that ability or skill set in such situations 
should not be an expectation.  Think about the suggestion by Knespser of creating a “third 
story.”  Write the Harvard Negotiation Project authors, “The Third Story is one an impartial 
observer, such as a mediator, would tell; it’s a version of events both sides can agree on” (Stone, 
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Patton, and Heen 1999).  Anything short of being able to generate that third story undercuts the 
usefulness and value of what a mediation process could bring to these conflicts.  Physicians not 
able to achieve that in a conflictual interaction with a patient need a resource external to the dyad 
of doctor and patient. 
 
The “Difficult” Patient and the Role of the Ethics Consultation Service 
The institution in American medicine charged with both addressing ethics-infused 
conflicts and possessing the skill set to mediate them is the ethics consultation service (ECS).  
Required by The Joint Commission, each hospital must have “a process that allows staff, 
patients, and families to address ethical issues” (TJC 2010), and this is operationalized in most 
institutions through an ethics committee and/or clinical ethicist.  It is the ECS that should provide 
the resource for resolving the ethically charged conflicts between the “difficult” patient and his 
or her clinical team that have not been able to be successfully managed within those 
relationships.  
That this species of conflict legitimately falls within the sphere of the ECS can be clearly 
seen in the self-described mission of those ethics bodies.  In a highly regarded national study of 
ECSs, participants were asked about the primary goals of their ethics consultation service (Fox et 
al 2007).  Assisting in the repair of the relationships between patients deemed “difficult” and the 
providers reluctant to continue working with them meets many of the most frequently cited goals 
of ECSs in that study: 77% of ECSs viewed their charge as “resolving real or imagined 
conflicts;” 75% as “changing patient care to improve quality;” 68% as “increasing patient/family 
satisfaction;” and, 50% as “meeting a perceived need of the staff” (Fox et al 2007).  Not only 
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does addressing these conflicts fit well within those explicit goals, I am arguing the stronger 
point that ECSs actually shirk their duty by failing to recognize this obligation as being part of 
their self-identified mandate.  Without a serious response to the real or imagined ethical offenses 
and injuries involved in these conflicts, patient care will necessarily remain sub-standard in the 
patients’ perspective, therefore, they couldn’t possibly feel satisfied with the care they have 
received; and correspondingly, the needs of the staff will also go unmet.   
If it is granted that conflicts involving the “difficult” patient arguably fall under the 
purview of the ECS, do ECSs possess the skill set to navigate them?  There are two separate 
issues embedded in this important question: first, what skills should an ECS have?; and, second, 
what skills do most ECSs actually possess?  Taking the latter question first, it is well-known that 
ECSs in general have little training (Fox et al 2007), and a task force created by the national 
bioethics organization – the American Society of Bioethics and Humanities – has been formed to 
address this pervasive problem (CECA 2010).  But although this may appear as a glib dodge to a 
very worrisome problem, my answer to the second question is that ECSs are currently no less 
qualified to navigate this type of ethics conflict than any other. 
The former question – what skills ought an ECS have? – has a more straightforward 
answer, and these skills make them the ideal body to resolve conflicts between patients labeled 
“difficult” and the providers they work with.  Universally, the various task forces charged with 
determining this key skill set deem mediation techniques – from facilitation to other modes of 
conflict resolution – as essential process skills.  For example, the National Working Group for 
the Clinical Ethics Credentialing Project lays out the “Fundamental Elements of Clinical Ethics 
Consultation,” writing “Clinical ethics consultation is an intervention in which a trained clinical 
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ethics professional: …employs expert discussion of bioethical principles, practices, and norms 
and uses reason, facilitation, negotiation, or mediation to seek a common judgment regarding a 
plan of care going forward” (Dubler et al 2009).  Similarly, the national bioethics organization 
(ASBH) recently revisited, and largely reaffirmed, its earlier report (Aulisio et al 2000) on the 
necessary qualifications of ECSs, what are known as the “Core Competencies” (ASBH 2011).  
They write, “We believe an ethics facilitation approach is most appropriate for HCEC 
[healthcare ethics consultation],” and they list, as an indispensable skill of facilitation, the ability 
to “apply mediation or other conflict resolution techniques” (ASBH 2011).  Further clarifying, 
they write, “Bioethics mediation is a well-tested conflict resolution technique.  It combines the 
clinical substance and perspective of clinical ethics consultation with the tools of the mediation 
process, using the techniques of mediation and dispute resolution to promote a principled 
resolution, compatible with the principles of bioethics and the legal rights of patients and 
families (ASBH 2011; referencing Dubler and Liebman 2011).  Others have made similar 
arguments on the essential role mediation plays in resolving clinical ethics disputes (Dubler and 
Liebman 2011; Caplan and Bergman 2009; Fiester 2007a; 2007b; 2011). 
If adequately trained in the compulsory competencies outlined by various clinical ethics 
working groups, the ECS is the ideal resource to provide assistance in mediating this class of 
ethics-related conflicts when they have proven intractable to the efforts of the treating providers.  
This work is not only commensurate with the mission and function of the ECS, but the resolution 
of these conflicts is universally recognized as requiring a very particular skill set that is rare 
among clinical providers and obligatory for members of ECSs.  Although the “difficult” patient 
and the dysfunctional patient-provider relationship that is its sequelae are currently not explicitly 
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named as cause for calling an ethics consult, this problematic dynamic likely undergirds the vast 
majority of the consults requested.  Explicitly identifying this type of conflict as a legitimate 
reason for prompting a consult would enable the resources of the ECS to be initiated early in the 
conflict, before it has irreparable consequences to the patient-provider relationship or a 
detrimental impact on provider morale.  We need to expand the moral mandate of the ECS to 
include addressing the conflicts between the “difficult” patient and the providers who treat them. 
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